In a supreme bit of irony, the Japanese had started World War II in the Pacific by attacking Pearl Harbor thousands of miles away in order to end their war in next-door China.
Their objective was to secure the so-called "Southern Resources Area",the Netherlands East Indies; now called Indonesia and to obtain the natural resources they needed to not so much win the war in China but to end that war while saving face.
By the end of February 1942, the Japanese were on the verge of seizing the Netherlands East Indies, with only the island of Java, the most populous island of the Indies and its commercial and political center, remaining to be conquered, and Java was cutoff and ready to fall.
The Allies, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, had always believed that defense of the Far East against the Japanese was an iffy proposition at best, but the speed of the Japanese advance was still surprising.
An attempt was made to pool their slender resources available into an organization called ABDACOM - the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command.
The naval component comprised of the USN Asiatic Fleet, elements of the British Far Eastern Fleet, the Dutch East Indies Squadron and elements of the Royal Australian Navy operating under Royal Navy command.
It was known as ABDA-Float, which by mid-February 1942 was commanded by the Dutch Admiral Conrad EL Helfrich RNN.
A fully-integrated multinational force, like ABDACOM was then what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is today, it was a relatively 'new fangled thing'.
From its inception, ABDA-Float wascrippled by three major issues:
1.Communications
Integrating sailors from four different countries and three different navies who spoke two different languages was never going to be easy.
The additional pressures of a fast and relentless Japanese advance made it next to impossible.
2.A complete lack of air power
The loss of the US Far Eastern Air Force (caught on the ground and destroyed by the Japanese due to the incompetence of US General Douglas MacArthur) and the British Malaya air force crippled ABDA air efforts, denied ABDA-Float necessary air protection and hampered intelligence gathering.
3.Operational accidents and mechanical breakdowns
The speed of the Japanese advance and the lack of air protection denied ABDA-Float the necessary time and security for maintenanceand repair of their ships and rest for the crews.
Facilities for such maintenance and repair in the Indies were basically limited to the principal Dutch naval base at Soerabaja (Surabaya), which became a major target for Japanese air attacks, and one floating drydock at Tjilatjap (Cilacap),inconveniently located on Java's southern coast.
The results further crippled Allied efforts.
These factors would show themselves again and again.
By the end of February, ABDACOM had proven to be ineffective and was dissolved, with the remaining ABDA forces placed under Dutch command for the last ditch defense of Java.
Defense was more akin to leaving ones head in a noose, however,as by then Java had been cut off by the losses of the islands of Malaya and Sumatra to the west, and the islands of Bali and Timor to the east.
Tactical command of the ABDA naval forces was placed in the hands of the aforementioned Karel Doorman.
Time and again, Doorman would sortie out to challenge the Japanese advance, only to be turned back by Japanese air attacks.
So often did this happen that Doorman's courage was questioned and he was nearly relieved of duty several times.
After the Battle of the Java Sea, questions about his courage seemed to vanish.
By the last few days of February 1942, Java itself was now under imminent threat.
It was do or die for the Allies.
The remaining ABDA warships,heavy cruisers HMS Exeter and USS Houston;light cruisers HNLMS De Ruyter, HNLMS Java
and HMAS Perth;and destroyers HMS Electra,HMS Encounter, HMS Jupiter, HNLMS Kortenaer, HNLMS Witte de With, USS John D Edwards, USS Alden,USS John D Ford and USS Paul Jones were combined into the appropriately named Combined Striking Force.
Doorman met with the ship captains on 26 February 1942,to plan their action, but with little time or intelligence information, only a limited amount of planning could be done. So desperate were the Allies that, in the event a ship was disabled or sunk, Doorman ordered that it was "..to be left to the mercy of the enemy..."
the few ships they had were too needed to fight to spare any for rescue missions.
On 26 February 1942, two Japanese invasion convoys, with warship escort, were reportedly descending on Java, one consisting of 56 transports for the western end of the island, the other of 41 transports for the eastern end.
The Combined Striking Force was sent out under Admiral
Doorman, with orders from Helfrich "to continue your attacks until the enemy is destroyed" in spite of utterly inadequate intelligence, to intercept the eastern convoy.
The hope was that the eastern convoy could be destroyed quickly so the Combined Striking Force could retire to
Tanjoeng Priok and sortie again to destroy the western convoy.
It was a desperate operational plan with little chance of success, but the Allies were long past the point of desperation.
Doorman had his force run a sweep north of Madoera island and Java during the night of the 26th and most of the 27th, But found nothing, suffered yet another air attack, and radioed Helfrich that hewas returning back to base on account of the exhaustion of his crews, who had apparently been constantly kept at battle stations.
This prompted a rather remarkable radio exchange in which
Helfrich scolded Doorman for turning back and admonished him to continue poking blindly for the convoy, and Doorman responded by telling Helfrich, obliquely and diplomatically, that if he wanted Doorman to attack the convoy then perhaps Helfrich should tell him where the convoy was.
Nevertheless, Doorman continued the search, but at 12:40 pm on the 27th reported again, "Personnel have this forenoon reached the point of exhaustion"; "because of the constant danger of air and surface attack,the crews has been kept at battle stations since their sortie on the 26th".
He decided to retire to Soerabaja and get the crews rest until he was given better information.
Typical of the Dutch luck in the war, Doorman got the location of the convoy late in the afternoon of the 27 as his force entered the swept channel of the minefield between Java and Madoera, the northern route into Soerabaja's harbor.
He immediately turned around in the middle of the minefield.
In fact,he strayed out of the swept channel into the minefield itself.
None of his ships hit any mines,but that luck with the mines would reverse itself later on.
Also typical of bad luck, Doorman's abrupt about face was witnessed by a Japanese float plane.
Unfortunately for the Allies, the convoy had an escort.
A strong one.
Two destroyer flotillas,the 4th with 6 destroyers and the light cruiser Naka under Rear Admiral Nishimura Shoji;and the 2nd with 8 destroyers under Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo,were sandwiched around two-thirds of the Japanese 5th Cruiser Division under Rear Admiral Takagi,who served as the Japanese Officer in Tactical Command for this action.
The 5th Cruiser Division (Sentai 5) nominally consisted of three of the four heavy cruisers of the Myoko class, Myoko,
Nachi and Haguro.
But for reasons known only to the Japanese the Myoko had been detached from Sentai 5 and attached to the fourth member of the class,Ashigara, to serve as 'distant support´ for the invasion,though in Japanese nomenclature 'distant support´ more often then not meant 'just far enough away to be of no reasonable use.´
The only contribution by the Ashigara and the Myoko to the campaign was to chase down the crippled HMS Exeter and a few cohorts.
It was a stupid decision, symptomatic of the arrogance, overconfidence and sloppiness that were slowly seeping into the Japanese naval war effort, to blow up in their faces four months later at the Battle of Midway.
But this campaign was too far gone for it to have much of an effect at this stage.
So Takagi had the Nachi and Haguro, two modern cruisers who each had ten 8-inch guns and sixteen torpedo tubes (eight on each side) capable of firing the legendary Type 93 'Long Lance´torpedo.
Takagi also had a stable of float planes on his cruisers to monitor Doorman's movements.
Doorman did not; having expected a night action, he had left his float planes ashore in keeping with Allied doctrine which regarded float planes as fire hazards in night battles.
TheJapanese, by contrast, were aggressive and creative with the use of their float planes throughout the war.
Takagi's float planes would prove to be a significant advantage and arguably the difference in the battle.
Not that it necessarily should have been.
The Allies did have their own seaplanes in the area:
Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boats - all three of them - from USN Patrol Wing 10.
They did not exactly have Doorman on their speed-dial, however, as the Japanese float planes did Takagi.
Patrol Wing 10s reports had to be funneled through the communications center for the Soerabaja Naval District ('Naval Commander Soerabaja´).
In contrast to the modernNachi and Haguroand the powerful Japanese Type 93 Long Lance torpedo, the Allied force, though the crews were brave and well-trained, was a fairly motley collection of ships:
HMS Exeter
With six 8-inch guns in three dual turrets plus torpedo tubes, the British heavy cruiser HMS Exeter was nominally the most heavily armed Allied cruiser on hand.
Fresh off her famous defeatof the German ³pocket battleship KMS Admiral Graf Spee off the Rio de la Plata, the HMS Exeter's crew was battle-tested as well.
But the cruiser was a little aged, in desperate need of serious maintenance,and had serious and ongoing problems with her fire control (targeting) and the train (rotation) limits of her No. 3 (aft) turret.
USS Houston
Like most USN cruisers,the heavy cruiser USS Houston was the victim of a monumentally stupid decision by the US Navy in the1930's to remove the torpedo tubes from its cruisers, which left them less effective against enemy ships in general and largely defenseless against battleships in particular.
The USS Houstonwas ostensibly the most heavily gunned
Allied cruiser,with nine 8-inch guns in three triple turrets, but her No. 3 (aft) turret had been disabled by a bomb hit three weeks earlier and could not be repaired in theater.
HNMLS Java
Laid down in 1916,the light cruiser HNMLS Java was designed to be more than a match for the Japanese cruisers of her time.
Unfortunately,her time had come and gone before her completion in 1925,at which point she was already obsolete. By 1942, the light cruiser was arguably not fit for front-line service, but the Dutch were so hard-pressed for ships they had little choice.
Though heavily modernized, with new fire control, an improved anti-aircraft package and a lot of paint, the HNMLS Java still suffered from the poor watertight compartmentalization suffered by the ships of her age.
Additionally,while she was heavily gunned with ten 5.9-inch guns, her guns were not in armored enclosed turrets with secure access to fortified magazines, but were instead scattered in single-gun mounts across the main deck.
She carried no torpedo tubes.
HNMLS De Ruyter
With an intimidating tower mast and sleek lines, Karel Doorman's light cruiser cum flagship was beautiful, but her beauty could not mask the fact that she had been built on the cheap and,consequently,was woefully underarmored and underarmed.
While the HNMLS De Ruyter did have state of the art fire control and a heavy anti-aircraft package featuring five twin-barreled Bofors 40 millimeter anti aircraft mounts, she carried no torpedo tubes and only seven 6-inch guns.
Worse, for reasons known only to the Dutch,only three of those guns faced forward, meaning that most of the cruiser's main armament faced behind her.
HNMLS Kortenaer
Two weeks earlier,the Dutch destroyer had been slated to take part in the Allied effort to oppose the Japanese landings on Bali.
However, the HNMLS Kortenaer ran aground while navigating the narrow, twisting channel out of Tjilatjap and had to be left behind.
The grounding caused damage to her boilers that could not be immediately repaired and limited her speed to 26 knots. By comparison,the slowest of Takagi's ships were capable of 31 knots.
USS John D Edwards,
USS Alden
USS John D Ford
USS Paul Jones
the four USN destroyers, grouped for this action into Destroyer Squadron 58, were from the Clemson class of
'flush deckers´ from the period just after World War I.
The 'four pipers´ or 'four stackers´ (so called because of their four smokestacks) were underarmored and undergunned, but contained a powerful battery of 12 torpedo tubes each (six on each side),which the Allies desperately needed right now. The ships were in bad shape,in serious need of maintenance
and suffered from old machinery,leaky feed-water pipes and bio fouled (Kelp, Barancles etc) bottoms that limited their speeds to 26 knots.
But this was the best the ABDA navies could do.
Fourteen ships, mostly old, worn and battered, from four different countries and three different navies speaking two different languages.
Crews eager to dish out some of what they had been taking, but pushed beyond the point of physical and mental exhaustion.
No chance to train together.
No chance to develop a common communications system.
Not nearly enough time or intelligence information to develop anything but the most rudimentary battle plan.
No accurate intelligence.
No air cover whatsoever.
If Doorman was to successfully carry out his orders, he would have to make it up as he went along.
Doorman's general plan,it seems,was to keep the Combined Striking Force between the Japanese and the Java coast, while making periodic thrusts north to try to catch the convoy. The Japanese intent was both to protect the convoy, using its warships as a screen, and neutralize the remaining ABDA naval assets.
Informed of Doorman's turnabout,Takagi raced to cut off the Allied approach to the invasion convoy.
Takagi was a submariner by training and it showed in his conduct in this battle.
Takagi and his staff also seem to have been unusually nervous by normal Japanese or combat officer standards, and seemed aghast that their wartime enemies were actually shooting at them.
Hara Tameichi, who commanded the Japanese destroyer Amatsukaze during the battle,wrote his memoirs 'Japanese Destroyer Captain' after the war.
His portrayal of Takagi therein is unflattering:
"an arrogant, cocky and haughty commander.
Takagi grumbled at being forced to intercept Doorman, as in his wisdom he had been 'escorting´ the convoy from 200 miles behind them.
Takagi had to race to catch up and got to the battlefield just as both sides sighted each other".
Nevertheless, Takagi managed to block the Combined Striking Force's initial approach to the convoy.
Forced by communication issues to keep his cruisers in a column, Doorman thrust blindly northwest, amazingly enough in the direction of the convoy.
With only the 8-inch guns of the HMS Exeter and the USS Houston possessing the necessary range, the Allies engaged the Japanese in a long range but ineffectual gun duel. Doorman attempted to close the range to enable his light cruisers to engage - But Takagi threatened to 'cross the T´ of the ABDA column.
Doormanwas thus forced to turn and close at a much slower pace to attempt to bring his 6-inch guns into range.
With the severe communication issues, Doorman had little choice but to give the Allied ships his famous order 'Follow me,´ and have them follow him like insect segments from the video game Centipede.
And like the video game Centipede, these segments were picked off one by one:
HMS Exeter
An 8-inch shell from the Haguro crashed through a gun mount and exploded in a boiler,knocking 5 of her 6 boilers off line and reducing her speed to between 5 and 10 knots. Spewingforth white steam from her damaged boilers, the
HMS Exeter sheered out of column so that the USS Houston behind her would not plow into her stern.
But the steam obscured the leading ship HNMLS De Ruyter from the remainder of the column,who thought they had missed an order to immediately turn,and they turned out of column just as the HMS Exeter had done, throwing the Combined Striking Force into Utter confusion.
Ultimately, the HMS Exeter was ordered to retire to Soerabaja.
HNMLS Kortenaer
The Allied cruisers were thrown into confusion in the path of oncoming Japanese torpedoes.
While a number of the torpedoes exploded prematurely, one also from theHaguro struck Lieutenant Commander A. Kroese's HNMLS Kortenaer amidships.
Her back broken, the destroyer jack-knifed, capsized and sank in a matter of minutes.
Not comprehending the torpedoes in their midst had come from the Japanese ships,the Allies had no idea of the extreme range of the Type 93; every Japanese cruiser and destroyer carried torpedoes,and most,also unbeknownst to the Allies, even carried one set of reloads.
The Allied crews were convinced they had been ambushed by Japanese submarines.
HMS Electra
To protect the Crippled HMS Exeter,Doorman signaled 'Counterattack' to the British destroyers.
While too scattered to mount a coordinated torpedo attack, the HMS Electra, HMS Encounter and HMS Jupiter moved to protect the HMS Exeter,supported by the HNMLS Witte de With.
The HMS Electra,having just laid a smoke screen for the HMS Exeter,now charged into that smoke screen and came out on the other side to face the entire Japanese 2nd Destroyer flotilla and part of the 4th.
Though she managed to temporarily disable the destroyer Asagumo, the HMS Electra's engines were knocked out by an early hit and her guns were picked off one by one, with the Jintsu administering particular tormenting fire to her.
She would succumb to the pounding.
HNMLS Witte de With
While charging to support the British destroyers, the HNMLS Witte de With was taking the opportunity to drop depth charges on the supposed Japanese submarines.
During high speed maneuvering,one of the readied depth charges was swept overboard and detonated under the destroyer's stern, damaging her propellers and knocking out two electrical generators.
Whether the HNMLS Witte de With was battleworthy or
seaworthy after this incident is unclear.
She was ordered to escort the HMS Exeter to Soerabaja, where she entered drydock, but was not repaired before the Dutch had to abandon the port and consequently was scuttled.
USS John D Edwards
USS Alden
USS John D Ford
USS Paul Jones
With darkness approaching, Doorman was eager to shake the Japanese escorts and find the convoy.
Apparently Doorman took his orders literally and did not consider that by destroying enough of the escorts he could force the convoy to turn back, a sign of Doorman's relative inexperience,which he shared with most American commanders at this stage of the war.
After a confusing series of orders and countermands, Doorman ordered the US Destroyer Squadron 58 to 'cover my retirement.´
DesRon 58's Commander, Thomas Binford, had no idea what that meant, but with his fuel running dangerously low and not wanting to return to base without firing his torpedoes in anger, he launched a long-range torpedo attack that forced the Japanese to turn away.
No hits were scored; whether this was because of the range, Japanese evasion or the almost complete ineffectiveness of USN torpedoes is unclear.
As it turns out, Binford did exactly what Doorman had wanted and left the Dutch admiral impressed with Binfords work.
Thus temporarily freed from the engagement, Doorman thrust to the north at dusk before giving up,when he was only 20 miles away from the convoy - just over the horizon to the northwest.
The US destroyers followed Doorman southward until the Allied column reached the Java coast, then with fuel almost gone, returned to Soerabaja.
It is at this perhaps unusual point that our story begins in earnest, for it is here that one can begin the identification of a subtle but conspicuously missing thread of the last hours of the battle recorded communications.
And it begins with what is probably one of the most freakish incidents of the war.
The loss of the HMS Jupiter,Doorman's turn to the south when, unbeknownst to him, his objective was only 20 miles away was the result of his complete lack of intelligence as to the Japanese movements and dispositions.
Doorman had an unfortunate habit of keeping his plans to himself, so it is not possible to know for certain what he was thinking.
But if the information and considerations Doorman had are examined, it is possible to assemble a likely scenario of what the unfortunate Dutch admiral was attempting to do during these last hours of his life.
In turning to the south, Doorman had likely despaired of finding the convoy by poking blindly,randomly in the dark in the middle of the Java Sea.
He does appear to have developed a better idea: go to the convoy's landing site and work back along their projected course track.
And Allied intelligence had a prediction of the convoys landing site: Toeban (Tuban) Bay, on Java's northern coast about 50 miles west of the channel to Soerabaja.
To prepare for the predicted landing, a Dutch infantry contingent had been stationed at Toeban, and Admiral Helfrichhad ordered the minelayer HNMLS Gouden Leeuw to lay a minefield at the southern end of the bay.
Doorman was informed of these developments.
That the prediction of the Japanese convoy landing at Toeban was little more than an educated guess mattered little.
It was not necessarily good information, but it was the best the Allies had,the best Doorman had, and so his best remaining option was to act on it.
The placement of the infantry would prove to be fortuitous, though not for reasons the Dutch had been considering; the minefield not so much.
When the Allied column reached the Java coast after dark, Doorman had them turn westward heading for Toeban, hugging the coast in the hopes of evading the notice of the Japanese while staying positioned between the Japanese and the coast.
It was a futile effort; Japanese float planes shadowed the Combined Striking Force in the moonlight.
At least by heading to the Japanese landing site the Allies had partially nullified the advantage given by the float planes; if the convoywas headed to Toeban it had only a limited number of maneuvers it could make.
But the floatplanes did mean there would be a fight.
So persistent were the float planes that the normally calm, stoic Doorman cursed them softly under his breath.
By this time, the Combined Striking Force had been reduced to a column led by the HNMLS De Ruyter,followed by the
HMAS Perth, USS Houston, HNMLS Java and HMS Jupiter.
The HMS Encounter was still operational and was trying to catch up to the cruiser column after being separated while screening the HMS Exeter,but she was well out of sight and so far behind that she was of little tactical use.
Together this little column steamed along close to the Java coast, too close for Captain Rooks of the USS Houston.
Being the heaviest remaining ship and the only heavy cruiser left, the USS Houston had a deeper draught than the other ships.
Captain Rooks grew concerned that the water was too shallow for the USS Houston and swung the heavy cruiser out of column onto an offset course,parallel to that of the other four in the squadron.
It may have saved his ship.
At around 2100,as the Allied column passed north of Toeban Bay, the HMS Jupiter, last in the column,suffered an underwater explosion on her starboard side that wrecked her No. 2 engineroom and caused her to lose all power.
She blinkered a signal to the HNMLS Java ahead of her 'Jupiter torpedoed,´presumably by a Japanese submarine.
Doorman apparently checked on the big British destroyer, but with no power to pump out the water pouring into her hull or to even move,her wound was mortal.
Fortunately, the HMS Jupiter was disabled so close to the Java coast that almost her entire crew was rescued from drowning,helped by the presence of the Dutch army contingent.
Either seeing or otherwise being convinced that the destroyer was close enough to shore to save most of the crew, Doorman continued onward to the west.
The HMS Jupiter sank at 0130 the next morning.
The cause of the HMS Jupiter's loss has never been conclusively determined.
Japanese records examined postwar showed no submarine in the area.
The most recent scholarship strongly suggests that the
HMS Jupiter was the victim of a discarded Dutch mine: the HNMLS Gouden Leeuw never laid the minefield in the southern end of Toeban Bay as ordered, but en route instead just dumped the mines, only a few of which were active, well north of their assigned position.
Thus, it appears the,Combined Striking Force just happened to sail through a patch of mines, only a few of which were armed, that had been unceremoniously dumped.
And one of those few that were armed just happened to strike a fatal blow against the big, new, overstrength (Crew) British destroyer HMS Jupiter.
If this scenario is correct, it would be one of the most freakish accidents of the war.
The question of how the HMS Jupiter was sunk is only the most prominent of the questions about this incident, but there are others.
How was Admiral Doorman informed of the HMS Jupiter's plight?
How was he able to check on her condition?
There are several plausible scenarios, but none of the available battle reports or survivors accounts even hint at a definitive solution.
By most standards,this issue would seem trivial, and understandably so.
Normally.
Clearly,Doorman was informed of the situation.
Clearly he was able to check on it.
But how is not recorded.
The communications to him and from him are not recorded.
This is an issue that repeats itself throughout these last hours of the Combined Striking Force:communications that obviously took place, but the record makes no mention of them.
They are most clearly shown in the next incident.
Having passed Toeban Bay and not found the Japanese convoy, Doorman proceeded to work his way back along the convoys projected route.
The HNMLS De Ruyter lead the column on a starboard turn to the north on a base course of 0 degrees True.
Doorman had the column run at very high speed and,without orders,zig zag slightly.
This was a tactic normally used to throw off submarine firing solutions, though at the expense of staying in the vicinity of the submarine.
In this case, Doorman probably wanted to confuse the trailing Japanese float planes as well.
In this once again,he failed.
The planes continued to spy on the Allied cruisers, dropping magnesium flares attached to little parachutes to backlight the cruisers themselves,and calcium float lights that burned on water to mark their course.
This northward thrust had them cross the area of the afternoon action, and pass the survivors of the sunken destroyer HNMLS Kortenaer,still trying to survive on the sea.
The HNMLS Kortenaer's skipper A Kroese,in his book The Dutch Navy at War,relates the experience of one of these survivors -
" At About midnight we heard the sound of movement on the water.
We looked up and suddenly we saw,clearly outlined in the moonlight,the shape of ships making straight for us.
Would we be picked up?
The ships loomed nearer,obviously going at top speed.
Soon we saw the rising water foaming at the bows.
Still they continued on their course directly towards us.
But this was getting dangerous!
These were not rescuers,but monsters which threatened to destroy us.
They were going to run us down in their mad run and crush us in their furiously churning propellers.
We yelled like madmen, not to be picked up but to warn them off.
And then suddenly we saw that they were our own cruisers racing along in the moonlit tropical night.
Probably they saw us,too,for the leading Ship HNMLS De Ruyter changed course slightly.
As they charged past us, almost touching us, the rafts were turned over and over in the wash.
But we cheered and shouted, for there high on the gun turrets we could clearly see our comrades.
In the noise and turmoil they raced past the Dutchman, the Australian, the American, and last another Dutchman, four cruisers going at top speed under a tropical moon.
I did not know that it could be such an impressive spectacle.
While they were speeding past, some Americans on the
USS Houston's stern dropped a flare.
It floated on the water,a dancing flame on the sea.
We followed the ships with our eyes until they were out of sight.
They had no destroyer protection any longer and their course was north towards the enemy...
Had Rear Admiral Doorman from his bridge on the flagship looked down on us with his quiet smile and given us a sympathetic thought?
All was quiet again around us.
Near us danced the flare.
We couldn¶t take our eyes off of it,for it was like a flame of hope.
Slowly the hours passed.
Then another ship appearedabove (sic) the horizon.
First we saw it from the beam.
Suddenly the vessel changed course and came straight for us.
It was some lonely destroyer or small cruiser, seemingly a straggler in this sea full of action.
Perhaps it was a Jap that had been damaged and was now withdrawing from the scene of battle.
We had not been in the water long enough to appreciate being picked up by the enemy to be made a prisoners of war. Intently and suspiciously,we watched the approaching ship.
'An English destroyer´, shouted one of the officers.
'It¶s the Encounter´, shouted another.
We all stared silently, then a shout of relief and joy broke out.
It was the HMS Encounter!
It almost seemed as if the flare from the USS Houston shared our joy and danced with pleasure, too.
Cleverly,the Commander of the HMS Encounter manoeuvred his ship alongside the rafts.
Nets were dropped, and all who could climb swarmed monkey-like up the ropes.
The wounded and those who were too weak had to be hauled aboard.
When we all had the firm deck of the destroyer under us, our hearts overflowed with gratitude.
We could have hugged the British sailors, but even if that's what you are feeling, you can't just show it.
You give your rescuers a firm hand-shake, and let them see that you appreciate very much the glass of grog they give you and the warm, dry clothes they provide from their own scanty wardrobes.
"Bad luck!" said the British sailors,shaking their heads because we had lost our ship.
Poor fellows!
The next night the HMS Encounter went down and there were no Allied ships left to pick up her survivors.
The next morning, 28 February 1942,the HMS Encounter disembarked us in Soerabaja.
A Dutch patrol boat brought us to shore"
This would be the last time anyone would see the Combined Striking Force before its final battle.
TO BE CONTINUED
Their objective was to secure the so-called "Southern Resources Area",the Netherlands East Indies; now called Indonesia and to obtain the natural resources they needed to not so much win the war in China but to end that war while saving face.
By the end of February 1942, the Japanese were on the verge of seizing the Netherlands East Indies, with only the island of Java, the most populous island of the Indies and its commercial and political center, remaining to be conquered, and Java was cutoff and ready to fall.
The Allies, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, had always believed that defense of the Far East against the Japanese was an iffy proposition at best, but the speed of the Japanese advance was still surprising.
An attempt was made to pool their slender resources available into an organization called ABDACOM - the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command.
The naval component comprised of the USN Asiatic Fleet, elements of the British Far Eastern Fleet, the Dutch East Indies Squadron and elements of the Royal Australian Navy operating under Royal Navy command.
It was known as ABDA-Float, which by mid-February 1942 was commanded by the Dutch Admiral Conrad EL Helfrich RNN.
A fully-integrated multinational force, like ABDACOM was then what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is today, it was a relatively 'new fangled thing'.
From its inception, ABDA-Float wascrippled by three major issues:
1.Communications
Integrating sailors from four different countries and three different navies who spoke two different languages was never going to be easy.
The additional pressures of a fast and relentless Japanese advance made it next to impossible.
2.A complete lack of air power
The loss of the US Far Eastern Air Force (caught on the ground and destroyed by the Japanese due to the incompetence of US General Douglas MacArthur) and the British Malaya air force crippled ABDA air efforts, denied ABDA-Float necessary air protection and hampered intelligence gathering.
3.Operational accidents and mechanical breakdowns
The speed of the Japanese advance and the lack of air protection denied ABDA-Float the necessary time and security for maintenanceand repair of their ships and rest for the crews.
Facilities for such maintenance and repair in the Indies were basically limited to the principal Dutch naval base at Soerabaja (Surabaya), which became a major target for Japanese air attacks, and one floating drydock at Tjilatjap (Cilacap),inconveniently located on Java's southern coast.
The results further crippled Allied efforts.
These factors would show themselves again and again.
By the end of February, ABDACOM had proven to be ineffective and was dissolved, with the remaining ABDA forces placed under Dutch command for the last ditch defense of Java.
Defense was more akin to leaving ones head in a noose, however,as by then Java had been cut off by the losses of the islands of Malaya and Sumatra to the west, and the islands of Bali and Timor to the east.
Tactical command of the ABDA naval forces was placed in the hands of the aforementioned Karel Doorman.
Time and again, Doorman would sortie out to challenge the Japanese advance, only to be turned back by Japanese air attacks.
So often did this happen that Doorman's courage was questioned and he was nearly relieved of duty several times.
After the Battle of the Java Sea, questions about his courage seemed to vanish.
By the last few days of February 1942, Java itself was now under imminent threat.
It was do or die for the Allies.
The remaining ABDA warships,heavy cruisers HMS Exeter and USS Houston;light cruisers HNLMS De Ruyter, HNLMS Java
and HMAS Perth;and destroyers HMS Electra,HMS Encounter, HMS Jupiter, HNLMS Kortenaer, HNLMS Witte de With, USS John D Edwards, USS Alden,USS John D Ford and USS Paul Jones were combined into the appropriately named Combined Striking Force.
Doorman met with the ship captains on 26 February 1942,to plan their action, but with little time or intelligence information, only a limited amount of planning could be done. So desperate were the Allies that, in the event a ship was disabled or sunk, Doorman ordered that it was "..to be left to the mercy of the enemy..."
the few ships they had were too needed to fight to spare any for rescue missions.
On 26 February 1942, two Japanese invasion convoys, with warship escort, were reportedly descending on Java, one consisting of 56 transports for the western end of the island, the other of 41 transports for the eastern end.
The Combined Striking Force was sent out under Admiral
Doorman, with orders from Helfrich "to continue your attacks until the enemy is destroyed" in spite of utterly inadequate intelligence, to intercept the eastern convoy.
The hope was that the eastern convoy could be destroyed quickly so the Combined Striking Force could retire to
Tanjoeng Priok and sortie again to destroy the western convoy.
It was a desperate operational plan with little chance of success, but the Allies were long past the point of desperation.
Doorman had his force run a sweep north of Madoera island and Java during the night of the 26th and most of the 27th, But found nothing, suffered yet another air attack, and radioed Helfrich that hewas returning back to base on account of the exhaustion of his crews, who had apparently been constantly kept at battle stations.
This prompted a rather remarkable radio exchange in which
Helfrich scolded Doorman for turning back and admonished him to continue poking blindly for the convoy, and Doorman responded by telling Helfrich, obliquely and diplomatically, that if he wanted Doorman to attack the convoy then perhaps Helfrich should tell him where the convoy was.
Nevertheless, Doorman continued the search, but at 12:40 pm on the 27th reported again, "Personnel have this forenoon reached the point of exhaustion"; "because of the constant danger of air and surface attack,the crews has been kept at battle stations since their sortie on the 26th".
He decided to retire to Soerabaja and get the crews rest until he was given better information.
Typical of the Dutch luck in the war, Doorman got the location of the convoy late in the afternoon of the 27 as his force entered the swept channel of the minefield between Java and Madoera, the northern route into Soerabaja's harbor.
He immediately turned around in the middle of the minefield.
In fact,he strayed out of the swept channel into the minefield itself.
None of his ships hit any mines,but that luck with the mines would reverse itself later on.
Also typical of bad luck, Doorman's abrupt about face was witnessed by a Japanese float plane.
Unfortunately for the Allies, the convoy had an escort.
A strong one.
Two destroyer flotillas,the 4th with 6 destroyers and the light cruiser Naka under Rear Admiral Nishimura Shoji;and the 2nd with 8 destroyers under Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo,were sandwiched around two-thirds of the Japanese 5th Cruiser Division under Rear Admiral Takagi,who served as the Japanese Officer in Tactical Command for this action.
The 5th Cruiser Division (Sentai 5) nominally consisted of three of the four heavy cruisers of the Myoko class, Myoko,
Nachi and Haguro.
But for reasons known only to the Japanese the Myoko had been detached from Sentai 5 and attached to the fourth member of the class,Ashigara, to serve as 'distant support´ for the invasion,though in Japanese nomenclature 'distant support´ more often then not meant 'just far enough away to be of no reasonable use.´
The only contribution by the Ashigara and the Myoko to the campaign was to chase down the crippled HMS Exeter and a few cohorts.
It was a stupid decision, symptomatic of the arrogance, overconfidence and sloppiness that were slowly seeping into the Japanese naval war effort, to blow up in their faces four months later at the Battle of Midway.
But this campaign was too far gone for it to have much of an effect at this stage.
So Takagi had the Nachi and Haguro, two modern cruisers who each had ten 8-inch guns and sixteen torpedo tubes (eight on each side) capable of firing the legendary Type 93 'Long Lance´torpedo.
Takagi also had a stable of float planes on his cruisers to monitor Doorman's movements.
Doorman did not; having expected a night action, he had left his float planes ashore in keeping with Allied doctrine which regarded float planes as fire hazards in night battles.
TheJapanese, by contrast, were aggressive and creative with the use of their float planes throughout the war.
Takagi's float planes would prove to be a significant advantage and arguably the difference in the battle.
Not that it necessarily should have been.
The Allies did have their own seaplanes in the area:
Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boats - all three of them - from USN Patrol Wing 10.
They did not exactly have Doorman on their speed-dial, however, as the Japanese float planes did Takagi.
Patrol Wing 10s reports had to be funneled through the communications center for the Soerabaja Naval District ('Naval Commander Soerabaja´).
In contrast to the modernNachi and Haguroand the powerful Japanese Type 93 Long Lance torpedo, the Allied force, though the crews were brave and well-trained, was a fairly motley collection of ships:
HMS Exeter
With six 8-inch guns in three dual turrets plus torpedo tubes, the British heavy cruiser HMS Exeter was nominally the most heavily armed Allied cruiser on hand.
Fresh off her famous defeatof the German ³pocket battleship KMS Admiral Graf Spee off the Rio de la Plata, the HMS Exeter's crew was battle-tested as well.
But the cruiser was a little aged, in desperate need of serious maintenance,and had serious and ongoing problems with her fire control (targeting) and the train (rotation) limits of her No. 3 (aft) turret.
USS Houston
Like most USN cruisers,the heavy cruiser USS Houston was the victim of a monumentally stupid decision by the US Navy in the1930's to remove the torpedo tubes from its cruisers, which left them less effective against enemy ships in general and largely defenseless against battleships in particular.
The USS Houstonwas ostensibly the most heavily gunned
Allied cruiser,with nine 8-inch guns in three triple turrets, but her No. 3 (aft) turret had been disabled by a bomb hit three weeks earlier and could not be repaired in theater.
HNMLS Java
Laid down in 1916,the light cruiser HNMLS Java was designed to be more than a match for the Japanese cruisers of her time.
Unfortunately,her time had come and gone before her completion in 1925,at which point she was already obsolete. By 1942, the light cruiser was arguably not fit for front-line service, but the Dutch were so hard-pressed for ships they had little choice.
Though heavily modernized, with new fire control, an improved anti-aircraft package and a lot of paint, the HNMLS Java still suffered from the poor watertight compartmentalization suffered by the ships of her age.
Additionally,while she was heavily gunned with ten 5.9-inch guns, her guns were not in armored enclosed turrets with secure access to fortified magazines, but were instead scattered in single-gun mounts across the main deck.
She carried no torpedo tubes.
HNMLS De Ruyter
With an intimidating tower mast and sleek lines, Karel Doorman's light cruiser cum flagship was beautiful, but her beauty could not mask the fact that she had been built on the cheap and,consequently,was woefully underarmored and underarmed.
While the HNMLS De Ruyter did have state of the art fire control and a heavy anti-aircraft package featuring five twin-barreled Bofors 40 millimeter anti aircraft mounts, she carried no torpedo tubes and only seven 6-inch guns.
Worse, for reasons known only to the Dutch,only three of those guns faced forward, meaning that most of the cruiser's main armament faced behind her.
HNMLS Kortenaer
Two weeks earlier,the Dutch destroyer had been slated to take part in the Allied effort to oppose the Japanese landings on Bali.
However, the HNMLS Kortenaer ran aground while navigating the narrow, twisting channel out of Tjilatjap and had to be left behind.
The grounding caused damage to her boilers that could not be immediately repaired and limited her speed to 26 knots. By comparison,the slowest of Takagi's ships were capable of 31 knots.
USS John D Edwards,
USS Alden
USS John D Ford
USS Paul Jones
the four USN destroyers, grouped for this action into Destroyer Squadron 58, were from the Clemson class of
'flush deckers´ from the period just after World War I.
The 'four pipers´ or 'four stackers´ (so called because of their four smokestacks) were underarmored and undergunned, but contained a powerful battery of 12 torpedo tubes each (six on each side),which the Allies desperately needed right now. The ships were in bad shape,in serious need of maintenance
and suffered from old machinery,leaky feed-water pipes and bio fouled (Kelp, Barancles etc) bottoms that limited their speeds to 26 knots.
But this was the best the ABDA navies could do.
Fourteen ships, mostly old, worn and battered, from four different countries and three different navies speaking two different languages.
Crews eager to dish out some of what they had been taking, but pushed beyond the point of physical and mental exhaustion.
No chance to train together.
No chance to develop a common communications system.
Not nearly enough time or intelligence information to develop anything but the most rudimentary battle plan.
No accurate intelligence.
No air cover whatsoever.
If Doorman was to successfully carry out his orders, he would have to make it up as he went along.
Doorman's general plan,it seems,was to keep the Combined Striking Force between the Japanese and the Java coast, while making periodic thrusts north to try to catch the convoy. The Japanese intent was both to protect the convoy, using its warships as a screen, and neutralize the remaining ABDA naval assets.
Informed of Doorman's turnabout,Takagi raced to cut off the Allied approach to the invasion convoy.
Takagi was a submariner by training and it showed in his conduct in this battle.
Takagi and his staff also seem to have been unusually nervous by normal Japanese or combat officer standards, and seemed aghast that their wartime enemies were actually shooting at them.
Hara Tameichi, who commanded the Japanese destroyer Amatsukaze during the battle,wrote his memoirs 'Japanese Destroyer Captain' after the war.
His portrayal of Takagi therein is unflattering:
"an arrogant, cocky and haughty commander.
Takagi grumbled at being forced to intercept Doorman, as in his wisdom he had been 'escorting´ the convoy from 200 miles behind them.
Takagi had to race to catch up and got to the battlefield just as both sides sighted each other".
Nevertheless, Takagi managed to block the Combined Striking Force's initial approach to the convoy.
Forced by communication issues to keep his cruisers in a column, Doorman thrust blindly northwest, amazingly enough in the direction of the convoy.
With only the 8-inch guns of the HMS Exeter and the USS Houston possessing the necessary range, the Allies engaged the Japanese in a long range but ineffectual gun duel. Doorman attempted to close the range to enable his light cruisers to engage - But Takagi threatened to 'cross the T´ of the ABDA column.
Doormanwas thus forced to turn and close at a much slower pace to attempt to bring his 6-inch guns into range.
With the severe communication issues, Doorman had little choice but to give the Allied ships his famous order 'Follow me,´ and have them follow him like insect segments from the video game Centipede.
And like the video game Centipede, these segments were picked off one by one:
HMS Exeter
An 8-inch shell from the Haguro crashed through a gun mount and exploded in a boiler,knocking 5 of her 6 boilers off line and reducing her speed to between 5 and 10 knots. Spewingforth white steam from her damaged boilers, the
HMS Exeter sheered out of column so that the USS Houston behind her would not plow into her stern.
But the steam obscured the leading ship HNMLS De Ruyter from the remainder of the column,who thought they had missed an order to immediately turn,and they turned out of column just as the HMS Exeter had done, throwing the Combined Striking Force into Utter confusion.
Ultimately, the HMS Exeter was ordered to retire to Soerabaja.
HNMLS Kortenaer
The Allied cruisers were thrown into confusion in the path of oncoming Japanese torpedoes.
While a number of the torpedoes exploded prematurely, one also from theHaguro struck Lieutenant Commander A. Kroese's HNMLS Kortenaer amidships.
Her back broken, the destroyer jack-knifed, capsized and sank in a matter of minutes.
Not comprehending the torpedoes in their midst had come from the Japanese ships,the Allies had no idea of the extreme range of the Type 93; every Japanese cruiser and destroyer carried torpedoes,and most,also unbeknownst to the Allies, even carried one set of reloads.
The Allied crews were convinced they had been ambushed by Japanese submarines.
HMS Electra
To protect the Crippled HMS Exeter,Doorman signaled 'Counterattack' to the British destroyers.
While too scattered to mount a coordinated torpedo attack, the HMS Electra, HMS Encounter and HMS Jupiter moved to protect the HMS Exeter,supported by the HNMLS Witte de With.
The HMS Electra,having just laid a smoke screen for the HMS Exeter,now charged into that smoke screen and came out on the other side to face the entire Japanese 2nd Destroyer flotilla and part of the 4th.
Though she managed to temporarily disable the destroyer Asagumo, the HMS Electra's engines were knocked out by an early hit and her guns were picked off one by one, with the Jintsu administering particular tormenting fire to her.
She would succumb to the pounding.
HNMLS Witte de With
While charging to support the British destroyers, the HNMLS Witte de With was taking the opportunity to drop depth charges on the supposed Japanese submarines.
During high speed maneuvering,one of the readied depth charges was swept overboard and detonated under the destroyer's stern, damaging her propellers and knocking out two electrical generators.
Whether the HNMLS Witte de With was battleworthy or
seaworthy after this incident is unclear.
She was ordered to escort the HMS Exeter to Soerabaja, where she entered drydock, but was not repaired before the Dutch had to abandon the port and consequently was scuttled.
USS John D Edwards
USS Alden
USS John D Ford
USS Paul Jones
With darkness approaching, Doorman was eager to shake the Japanese escorts and find the convoy.
Apparently Doorman took his orders literally and did not consider that by destroying enough of the escorts he could force the convoy to turn back, a sign of Doorman's relative inexperience,which he shared with most American commanders at this stage of the war.
After a confusing series of orders and countermands, Doorman ordered the US Destroyer Squadron 58 to 'cover my retirement.´
DesRon 58's Commander, Thomas Binford, had no idea what that meant, but with his fuel running dangerously low and not wanting to return to base without firing his torpedoes in anger, he launched a long-range torpedo attack that forced the Japanese to turn away.
No hits were scored; whether this was because of the range, Japanese evasion or the almost complete ineffectiveness of USN torpedoes is unclear.
As it turns out, Binford did exactly what Doorman had wanted and left the Dutch admiral impressed with Binfords work.
Thus temporarily freed from the engagement, Doorman thrust to the north at dusk before giving up,when he was only 20 miles away from the convoy - just over the horizon to the northwest.
The US destroyers followed Doorman southward until the Allied column reached the Java coast, then with fuel almost gone, returned to Soerabaja.
It is at this perhaps unusual point that our story begins in earnest, for it is here that one can begin the identification of a subtle but conspicuously missing thread of the last hours of the battle recorded communications.
And it begins with what is probably one of the most freakish incidents of the war.
The loss of the HMS Jupiter,Doorman's turn to the south when, unbeknownst to him, his objective was only 20 miles away was the result of his complete lack of intelligence as to the Japanese movements and dispositions.
Doorman had an unfortunate habit of keeping his plans to himself, so it is not possible to know for certain what he was thinking.
But if the information and considerations Doorman had are examined, it is possible to assemble a likely scenario of what the unfortunate Dutch admiral was attempting to do during these last hours of his life.
In turning to the south, Doorman had likely despaired of finding the convoy by poking blindly,randomly in the dark in the middle of the Java Sea.
He does appear to have developed a better idea: go to the convoy's landing site and work back along their projected course track.
And Allied intelligence had a prediction of the convoys landing site: Toeban (Tuban) Bay, on Java's northern coast about 50 miles west of the channel to Soerabaja.
To prepare for the predicted landing, a Dutch infantry contingent had been stationed at Toeban, and Admiral Helfrichhad ordered the minelayer HNMLS Gouden Leeuw to lay a minefield at the southern end of the bay.
Doorman was informed of these developments.
That the prediction of the Japanese convoy landing at Toeban was little more than an educated guess mattered little.
It was not necessarily good information, but it was the best the Allies had,the best Doorman had, and so his best remaining option was to act on it.
The placement of the infantry would prove to be fortuitous, though not for reasons the Dutch had been considering; the minefield not so much.
When the Allied column reached the Java coast after dark, Doorman had them turn westward heading for Toeban, hugging the coast in the hopes of evading the notice of the Japanese while staying positioned between the Japanese and the coast.
It was a futile effort; Japanese float planes shadowed the Combined Striking Force in the moonlight.
At least by heading to the Japanese landing site the Allies had partially nullified the advantage given by the float planes; if the convoywas headed to Toeban it had only a limited number of maneuvers it could make.
But the floatplanes did mean there would be a fight.
So persistent were the float planes that the normally calm, stoic Doorman cursed them softly under his breath.
By this time, the Combined Striking Force had been reduced to a column led by the HNMLS De Ruyter,followed by the
HMAS Perth, USS Houston, HNMLS Java and HMS Jupiter.
The HMS Encounter was still operational and was trying to catch up to the cruiser column after being separated while screening the HMS Exeter,but she was well out of sight and so far behind that she was of little tactical use.
Together this little column steamed along close to the Java coast, too close for Captain Rooks of the USS Houston.
Being the heaviest remaining ship and the only heavy cruiser left, the USS Houston had a deeper draught than the other ships.
Captain Rooks grew concerned that the water was too shallow for the USS Houston and swung the heavy cruiser out of column onto an offset course,parallel to that of the other four in the squadron.
It may have saved his ship.
At around 2100,as the Allied column passed north of Toeban Bay, the HMS Jupiter, last in the column,suffered an underwater explosion on her starboard side that wrecked her No. 2 engineroom and caused her to lose all power.
She blinkered a signal to the HNMLS Java ahead of her 'Jupiter torpedoed,´presumably by a Japanese submarine.
Doorman apparently checked on the big British destroyer, but with no power to pump out the water pouring into her hull or to even move,her wound was mortal.
Fortunately, the HMS Jupiter was disabled so close to the Java coast that almost her entire crew was rescued from drowning,helped by the presence of the Dutch army contingent.
Either seeing or otherwise being convinced that the destroyer was close enough to shore to save most of the crew, Doorman continued onward to the west.
The HMS Jupiter sank at 0130 the next morning.
The cause of the HMS Jupiter's loss has never been conclusively determined.
Japanese records examined postwar showed no submarine in the area.
The most recent scholarship strongly suggests that the
HMS Jupiter was the victim of a discarded Dutch mine: the HNMLS Gouden Leeuw never laid the minefield in the southern end of Toeban Bay as ordered, but en route instead just dumped the mines, only a few of which were active, well north of their assigned position.
Thus, it appears the,Combined Striking Force just happened to sail through a patch of mines, only a few of which were armed, that had been unceremoniously dumped.
And one of those few that were armed just happened to strike a fatal blow against the big, new, overstrength (Crew) British destroyer HMS Jupiter.
If this scenario is correct, it would be one of the most freakish accidents of the war.
The question of how the HMS Jupiter was sunk is only the most prominent of the questions about this incident, but there are others.
How was Admiral Doorman informed of the HMS Jupiter's plight?
How was he able to check on her condition?
There are several plausible scenarios, but none of the available battle reports or survivors accounts even hint at a definitive solution.
By most standards,this issue would seem trivial, and understandably so.
Normally.
Clearly,Doorman was informed of the situation.
Clearly he was able to check on it.
But how is not recorded.
The communications to him and from him are not recorded.
This is an issue that repeats itself throughout these last hours of the Combined Striking Force:communications that obviously took place, but the record makes no mention of them.
They are most clearly shown in the next incident.
Having passed Toeban Bay and not found the Japanese convoy, Doorman proceeded to work his way back along the convoys projected route.
The HNMLS De Ruyter lead the column on a starboard turn to the north on a base course of 0 degrees True.
Doorman had the column run at very high speed and,without orders,zig zag slightly.
This was a tactic normally used to throw off submarine firing solutions, though at the expense of staying in the vicinity of the submarine.
In this case, Doorman probably wanted to confuse the trailing Japanese float planes as well.
In this once again,he failed.
The planes continued to spy on the Allied cruisers, dropping magnesium flares attached to little parachutes to backlight the cruisers themselves,and calcium float lights that burned on water to mark their course.
This northward thrust had them cross the area of the afternoon action, and pass the survivors of the sunken destroyer HNMLS Kortenaer,still trying to survive on the sea.
The HNMLS Kortenaer's skipper A Kroese,in his book The Dutch Navy at War,relates the experience of one of these survivors -
" At About midnight we heard the sound of movement on the water.
We looked up and suddenly we saw,clearly outlined in the moonlight,the shape of ships making straight for us.
Would we be picked up?
The ships loomed nearer,obviously going at top speed.
Soon we saw the rising water foaming at the bows.
Still they continued on their course directly towards us.
But this was getting dangerous!
These were not rescuers,but monsters which threatened to destroy us.
They were going to run us down in their mad run and crush us in their furiously churning propellers.
We yelled like madmen, not to be picked up but to warn them off.
And then suddenly we saw that they were our own cruisers racing along in the moonlit tropical night.
Probably they saw us,too,for the leading Ship HNMLS De Ruyter changed course slightly.
As they charged past us, almost touching us, the rafts were turned over and over in the wash.
But we cheered and shouted, for there high on the gun turrets we could clearly see our comrades.
In the noise and turmoil they raced past the Dutchman, the Australian, the American, and last another Dutchman, four cruisers going at top speed under a tropical moon.
I did not know that it could be such an impressive spectacle.
While they were speeding past, some Americans on the
USS Houston's stern dropped a flare.
It floated on the water,a dancing flame on the sea.
We followed the ships with our eyes until they were out of sight.
They had no destroyer protection any longer and their course was north towards the enemy...
Had Rear Admiral Doorman from his bridge on the flagship looked down on us with his quiet smile and given us a sympathetic thought?
All was quiet again around us.
Near us danced the flare.
We couldn¶t take our eyes off of it,for it was like a flame of hope.
Slowly the hours passed.
Then another ship appearedabove (sic) the horizon.
First we saw it from the beam.
Suddenly the vessel changed course and came straight for us.
It was some lonely destroyer or small cruiser, seemingly a straggler in this sea full of action.
Perhaps it was a Jap that had been damaged and was now withdrawing from the scene of battle.
We had not been in the water long enough to appreciate being picked up by the enemy to be made a prisoners of war. Intently and suspiciously,we watched the approaching ship.
'An English destroyer´, shouted one of the officers.
'It¶s the Encounter´, shouted another.
We all stared silently, then a shout of relief and joy broke out.
It was the HMS Encounter!
It almost seemed as if the flare from the USS Houston shared our joy and danced with pleasure, too.
Cleverly,the Commander of the HMS Encounter manoeuvred his ship alongside the rafts.
Nets were dropped, and all who could climb swarmed monkey-like up the ropes.
The wounded and those who were too weak had to be hauled aboard.
When we all had the firm deck of the destroyer under us, our hearts overflowed with gratitude.
We could have hugged the British sailors, but even if that's what you are feeling, you can't just show it.
You give your rescuers a firm hand-shake, and let them see that you appreciate very much the glass of grog they give you and the warm, dry clothes they provide from their own scanty wardrobes.
"Bad luck!" said the British sailors,shaking their heads because we had lost our ship.
Poor fellows!
The next night the HMS Encounter went down and there were no Allied ships left to pick up her survivors.
The next morning, 28 February 1942,the HMS Encounter disembarked us in Soerabaja.
A Dutch patrol boat brought us to shore"
This would be the last time anyone would see the Combined Striking Force before its final battle.
TO BE CONTINUED